1 Introduction and Objectives

1.2 Changing Operating Environment for Humanitarian Agencies

Since the early 1990s, humanitarian agencies have experienced increased exposure to situations in which they must negotiate with armed groups. This is due primarily to the changing nature of the operating environment in which humanitarian action is undertaken. Some aspects of the changing operating environment that are relevant to humanitarian negotiations with armed groups include the following:

First, contemporary conflicts take place predominantly within States rather than between them, with the result that one or more parties to a conflict are now more likely to be armed groups.⁴ Humanitarian agencies responding to complex emergencies resulting from these conflicts (or other underlying conditions) are thus more likely to encounter armed groups in their work.⁵

Second, an evolving body of military doctrine on Peace and Peace Support Operations being developed by key military forces (individual States, State-alliances such as NATO, and UN peacekeeping operations), and the involvement of military forces in operations other than war — including relief operations — has increased the complexities of interactions between humanitarian and military actors. The engagement of military forces in relief operations and so-called “hearts and minds” operations to win local support blurs the distinction between military and humanitarian actors, thereby contributing to the erosion and constricting of humanitarian space. This fading distinction has placed increased emphasis on the need for humanitarian organizations to (i) negotiate for a safe and secure operating environment for humanitarian action, and (ii) maintain a distinct identity, separate from military actors.

Third, in light of experiences during the 1990s, there has been a move towards a more integrated approach to UN peace operations, which has seen the roles and work of UN humanitarian agencies included or integrated (to varying degrees depending on the mission) under the overall administrative and decision-making structure of a UN mission (e.g. UN missions in Liberia, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi).⁶ The issue of integrated UN peacekeeping missions is the subject of ongoing debate, but clearly these types of missions impose new opportunities and challenges for humanitarian agencies as they try to maintain their impartial and neutral working environment to carry out their mandate. In integrated missions, humanitarian, military and/or political negotiations should still remain distinct from each other, but may be ongoing in parallel.

Ensuring coherence across these different negotiations poses a particular challenge that must be addressed because all of the negotiations will have an impact on the success or failure of the mission. Section 2.5 presents guidance for coordination of negotiations among humanitarian actors and for dealing with UN political and humanitarian negotiations.

Fourth, in recent years there has been a trend towards the direct targeting of humanitarian and development workers in conflict zones and in some situations of post-conflict transition. For example, in Afghanistan there was an average of 13 armed attacks on aid workers per month for the first five months of 2004, compared to an average of 8.8 attacks per month over the first five months of the preceding year.⁷ In this environment, there is an increased need to negotiate with all parties to a conflict (including armed groups) to ensure the safety and security of humanitarian operations and staff, as well as the civilians they assist.

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⁴In the twelve-year period from 1990 to 2001, there were 57 major armed conflicts (exhibiting at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year) in the world, of which all but three were internal. Source: Mikael Eriksson, Ed. States in Armed Conflict 2001 ( Uppsala : Department of Peace and Conflict Resolution, Uppsala University , 2002).

⁵A complex emergency, as defined by the IASC, is: “ A humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing United Nations country program.”

⁶ This move towards a more integrated approach to mission planning and execution within the UN system has its origins in the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (“The Brahimi Report”) (A/55/305) of 21 August 2000, and in subsequent reports of the UN Secretary-General on implementation of the Report's findings and recommendations (for example, Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations , UN Doc. Ref. A/55/502, 20 October 2000).

⁷Source: Afghan NGO Security Office (ANSO) and British Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG) Monthly Update, June 2004. Quoted in: Gerard Mc Hugh and Lola Gostelow, Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Humanitarian-Military Relations in Afghanistan (London : Save the Children UK , 2004).