2 Humanitarian Negotiations: Motivations and Partners

2.2 Being Clear About Reasons for Negotiating

Since negotiation is but one form of engagement with armed groups (see Section 1.1), humanitarian organizations need to be clear about why they are entering into negotiations with these groups. It may be that some other type of interaction (perhaps an advocacy or liaison relationship) may in some cases be more appropriate.

For humanitarian actors, the overall objective of humanitarian negotiations should be to secure the cooperation of an armed group in reaching an agreed outcome or understanding that will facilitate or enhance humanitarian action.

Once it is clear that the intended objective of negotiation justifies the interaction, the actual process itself can provide additional, collateral reasons for negotiation:

• The process of negotiation can build trust and confidence between the parties, which can in turn result in humanitarian benefits separate from the actual substance of the negotiations.

• The process of negotiation can have a multiplier effect in terms of involving armed groups in a wider dialogue that may bring additional benefits (for example, the humanitarian negotiations may assist in resolving the underlying causes of the conflict). However, humanitarian negotiations must never be used as a substitute for political negotiations.

In some cases, the process of negotiation can take on a life of its own, overshadowing the purpose of the negotiations. For humanitarian negotiations it is crucial to keep the objectives of the negotiations clearly in sight, while ensuring that the process of negotiation stands the best chance of achieving those objectives.

2.2.1 The Substance of the Negotiations

The provision of humanitarian assistance to those in need and the provision and promotion of protection for vulnerable groups represent two interconnected dimensions of humanitarian action.11 Humanitarian negotiations can be undertaken in pursuit of a number of goals spanning these two dimensions of humanitarian action:

  • To secure humanitarian access to reach those in need;
  • To seek agreement on ground rules for activities and behaviour of humanitarian actors and armed groups;
  • To secure agreement on operational mechanisms to facilitate direct provision of assistance to those in need (especially in areas under the control or influence of armed groups);
  • To agree on rules and behaviour of belligerents that will improve the protection of civilians in areas under the control or influence of armed groups, in accordance with international humanitarian law and international human rights law;
  • To safeguard humanitarian security — a term used here to encapsulate the various aspects of physical and psychological safety of both humanitarian staff and the beneficiaries of humanitarian action;
  • To secure the release of persons being held by armed groups against their will, including humanitarian workers held hostage and civilian detainees;
  • To secure agreement on special protection areas or periods (for example, to secure agreement on conducting immunizations over a particular period of days).

Examples of humanitarian negotiations undertaken on some of these issues, and the different approaches to negotiation they may involve, are provided in Chapter 5.

2.2.2 Knowing When to Adopt a More Cautious Approach to Negotiation

In all cases of negotiation with armed groups, humanitarian, development and human rights organizations must carefully balance the expected outcomes against the possible consequences of negotiation (described in Section 6.2). In certain cases, conditions may dictate that humanitarian staff should approach negotiations more cautiously, or perhaps should not negotiate at all with certain armed groups.

The circumstances in which humanitarian organizations may need to take a more cautious approach to negotiations with armed groups include the following:

• When there is a likelihood that negotiations could negatively impact humanitarian conditions or jeopardize the security of the beneficiaries: Armed groups may sometimes use their ability to exert force against civilian populations as a bargaining tool during negotiations. Humanitarian negotiators must be aware of this potential from the outset. In addition, negotiations that are undertaken poorly, especially multi-party negotiations, can in some cases actually exacerbate disputes between opposing armed groups, and may therefore lead to a worsening of humanitarian and security conditions.

• When the humanitarian negotiations can put the lives of the armed group interlocutors at risk: Identification of the armed group's negotiators can in some instances place them at risk of being targeted (physically or by indirect sanctions on a particular population group, e.g. the village home to the armed group representative(s)) by the group's adversaries. Targeting of armed group interlocutors as a result of their participation in humanitarian negotiations can in turn result in increased security risks for the humanitarian negotiators themselves, and possible termination of the negotiations.

Case Study: Impact of the Process of Humanitarian Negotiations on Armed Groups' Engagement in Political Dialogue

In July 2004 the UK NGO Conciliation Resources hosted a workshop on “Engaging Armed Groups in Peace Processes,” which included participants from armed groups, official and unofficial mediators in peace processes, donor governments and academics.

One theme of the discussion focused on the impact of engagement on humanitarian issues on the broader process of engagement in political dialogue. Some of the main points captured in that discussion were: 12

  • humanitarian negotiation can shed light on a group's willingness and ability to negotiate more generally and can serve as a confidence-building measure;
  • investment in the success of negotiated humanitarian outcomes might give an armed group a greater stake in not returning to conflict;
  • “engagement on humanitarian questions potentially creates the “political cover” for talks to spill over into more political issues, thus easing the armed groups into the peace process.”
  • “intermediaries and armed groups should think proactively about the possible positive impact humanitarian engagement could have in the process of political engagement.”

However, notwithstanding the perspectives on humanitarian negotiations being used as “political cover” captured in these discussions, humanitarian negotiations must remain separate from political negotiations; must retain a distinct humanitarian purpose and identity; and must not be used as a substitute for political negotiations.

• When armed groups attempt to use humanitarian negotiations to enhance their perceived legitimacy: Armed groups may seek to use humanitarian negotiations to enhance their positioning in other interactions (e.g. with political actors), and to misuse these negotiations as a vehicle for supporting their claims of legitimacy. In case of doubts in this regard, humanitarian negotiators should request a demonstration of commitment from the armed group before or during negotiations.

• When armed groups are believed to be playing several humanitarian actors off against each other for their own gain: Armed groups may attempt to enter into separate negotiations with different humanitarian agencies, in an effort to leverage their position and fragment the humanitarian community. This reinforces the need for humanitarian agencies to adopt a coordinated or collective approach to humanitarian negotiations (see Section 2.5).

• When the armed group attaches conditions for the implementation of an agreement that could adversely affect the civilian population: Humanitarian negotiators should not enter into negotiations or agreements with armed groups when there are conditions attached that may adversely affect the humanitarian circumstances of others.

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11A growing consensus has emerged within the humanitarian community on the need to better integrate protection and assistance as two dimensions of humanitarian action. For example, in its Policy Paper on Protection of Internally Displaced Persons, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) recognized the need to “ integrate protection features into operational response and remedial action. ” See: Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), Protection of Internally Displaced Persons , IASC Policy Paper (New York: IASC, 1999).

12 Source: Conciliation Resources, Engaging Armed Groups in Peace Processes. Joint analysis workshop report (London: Conciliation Resources' Accord Programme, July 2004).

 

 
   
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