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2.3 Characteristics of Armed Groups
A working definition of non-State armed groups was provided in Section 1.1 of this manual. Table 1 elaborates on the key characteristics of armed groups captured in that definition, and identifies what those characteristics mean for humanitarian negotiations with such groups.
Table 1
Characteristics of armed groups and what they mean for humanitarian negotiators
Characteristics of Armed groups: They…
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What humanitarian negotiators need to be aware of based on these characteristics:
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Have the potential to employ arms in the use of force for political, ideological, or economic objectives;
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- Humanitarian negotiations do not infer any legal status, legitimacy or recognition of the armed group;
- Humanitarian negotiators should explore the driving motivations and interests behind the actions of the armed group (See Section 2.4);
- Humanitarian negotiations do not in any way dilute the accountability of the armed group for past/current/future actions, especially in cases where armed groups act outside the norms of international law (Section 3.3);
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Have a group identity, and act in pursuit of their objectives as a group
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- Individual Members of an armed group will always have their own agendas, however an armed group (different from a group of armed individuals) shares some common history, aspirations, objectives, or needs that are attributes of the group ;
- Members of an armed group will be strongly influenced by group conformity pressures such as depersonalization of victims; perceptions of impunity; moral disengagement and obedience to group authority;13
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Are not within the formal military structures of States, State-alliances or intergovernmental organizations;
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- This characteristic of non-State armed groups has important implications for enforcing accountability for the actions of members of the group. The ‘extra-State' status of armed groups means that the applicable legal provisions relating to the duties and obligations of these groups under international law may differ from the duties and obligations of States, and for certain provisions there remains some legal uncertainty as to the extent that those provisions apply to armed groups; (see Section 3.3 below)
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Are not under the command or control of the State(s) in which they operate;
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- Armed groups may not be under the command or control of the State(s) in which they operate, but they may receive direct/indirect support of the host government or other States, or may be provided with a safe haven in certain countries;
- Humanitarian negotiators need to be aware of the potential for influencing parties that support armed groups. Hence there may be other counterparts for humanitarian engagement (including negotiation) beyond the initial targeted armed group;
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Are subject to a chain of command (formal or informal). |
- This is an important attribute of armed groups, because it means (at least in theory) that there is some degree of centralized command and control, however limited, over the actions of group members. When this centralized command structure breaks down, it can no longer be considered to be one armed group, and humanitarian negotiators may have to identify interlocutors within several factions of the original group;
- When a chain of command (however limited) is functioning, it increases the likelihood that lower-ranking members of the group will respect the undertakings and agreed outcomes negotiated by and with their leaders;
- In implementing an outcome agreed with the leaders of an armed group, humanitarian workers should attempt to identify the local chain of command to increase the likelihood that any agreed outcome will be respected and implemented by lower-ranking members of the group;
- Humanitarian negotiators should communicate their expectations that an agreed outcome will be respected by all members of the armed group.
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Case Study: Encouraging communicating through chain of command
In Sierra Leone during 1999/2000 the UN World Food Programme (WFP) found that in many cases it could not be taken for granted that armed group leaders had communicated the existence, scope or objectives of any negotiated agreement to local-level commanders and members of the group. One approach used to bridge this communication gap was ‘sensitization' of members of the group on the ground by influential armed group commanders:
“As a way to reduce the lack of communication between official leaders of armed groups and their local commanders, and ensure that access would be given on the ground, major international food distributions led by WFP were preceded by a sensitization of the forces on the ground carried out by influential RUF commanders.” 14 |
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13For more information on group conformity and the actions of combatants, see: Daniel Munoz-Rojas and Jean-Jacques Frésard, The Roots of Behaviour in War: Understanding and Preventing IHL Violations ( Geneva : International Committee of the Red Cross, October 2004).
14 Source: World Food Programme (WFP), Review of WFP Experience in Securing Humanitarian Access: Compilation of Past Practice, 2000.
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