Case Study: UNICEF Negotiations with LTTE

The UNICEF Country and Field Offices in Sri Lanka have engaged with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) because it is a significant group involved in the 2 decade armed conflict with the Government of Sri Lanka and controlling parts of the war-affected North Eastern provinces of the country. This case study captures aspects of UNICEF's experience of negotiating with the LTTE armed group.

Reason for negotiating

(Section 2.2)

Primacy of Humanitarian Mission:

• UNICEF has made it clear to the LTTE that the organization's priority is the protection of children. UNICEF also expressed its neutrality regarding its involvement with the 2 parties to the conflict.

  Substantive Issues:

• Ensuring that the LTTE does not recruit children in their armed forces under the age of 17, as the LTTE committed in 1998 to the Special Representative of the UN Secretary- General on Children and Armed Conflict (SRSG-CAC).

• Ensuring LTTE commitment not to recruit children under 18 years [as given to UNICEF in 2002].

• LTTE signing of the Action Plan for Children affected by War in 2003.

• Access to populations in LTTE-controlled areas.

• Negotiation of travel passes and general security issues.

Learning about the armed group

(Section 2.4)

• The LTTE has a sophisticated structure, including a political wing and a military wing; UNICEF has mainly interacted with the political wing.
  
• UNICEF experience highlights the fact that It is important to be cognizant of the power politics that take place within a group, and understand whether or not the person with whom the humanitarian organization is engaging is in a position to make commitments on behalf of the group as a whole.

Issue of legitimacy

(Section 2.4)

• The LTTE has been recognized by the government as a group with which it must negotiate peace.
  
• UNICEF has always engaged with the LTTE with full knowledge of the Government of Sri Lanka, and with the understanding that this engagement will not confer any additional legitimacy to the group.

Humanitarian partners in negotiation

(Section 2.5)

• In the LTTE-controlled area of Vanni, only UNICEF and UNHCR engage regularly with LTTE from the UN system; but there have also been some contacts between the LTTE and other UN agencies.
  
• Agency engagement with the LTTE is discussed both at the level of the UN Country Team (monthly) and on a more regular basis bilaterally.
  
• Generally, each UN agency in Sri Lanka engages separately based on its own agenda.

Framing the negotiations

(Chapter 3)

• Neutrality is essential if one is to influence the armed group, as the perception may exist that the UN is on the side of the government.
  
• The human rights instruments of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Optional Protocol on children and armed conflict to the CRC and the commitments made by the LTTE to the SRSG-CAC are the standards used by UNICEF Sri Lanka in its negotiations with the LTTE.
  
• Aggressive promotion of international law may generally not be as successful as expected. Many armed groups have not been sensitized to agree with these laws;

Three phases of negotiation

(Section 4.2)

Phase II: Seeking Agreement

• UNICEF has worked to seek agreement with the LTTE on a number of issues (identified above); Whilst many agreements have been informal and verbal (see below), a significant step forward was of the LTTE and GOSL both signing the Action Plan in 2003, which included reintegration of child soldiers.
  
• UNICEF representatives have worked with LTTE counterparts to develop options for agreement on particular issues.

Phase III: Implementation

• In 1998, the SRSG-CAC met with the LTTE and secured a statement from the group that it would cease the recruitment of children into their armed forces, allow freedom of movement for the civilian population, and greater freedom for women. UNICEF was responsible for follow-up on this.
  No specific mechanism was put in place to monitor adherence to the agreement at that time.
  
• Consistent advocacy led to the development of the Action Plan.
  
• Regular and repeated engagement ensures that the group understands not only UNICEF's priorities, but also that UNICEF is working for the good of the communities in areas under their control.

Direct vs. Indirect negotiation

(Section 4.3)

UNICEF has engaged with the LTTE at all levels of the agency;

• Direct engagement between the LTTE and the Sri Lanka UNICEF Country Office has been through advocacy, leading to verbal commitments from the LTTE.
  
• While most of the negotiations, agreements and exchanges between UNICEF and LTTE have been purely verbal and informal, UNICEF has documented some discussions and provided this to the LTTE.
  
• Written communication, whilst limited, has been significant in later stages of negotiation.
  
• UNICEF has never negotiated indirectly with the LTTE.

Possible implications of negotiations

(Section 6.2)

• Third-party influences: Governments may express concerns about anyone engaging with opposition armed groups, especially the UN, but they can be persuaded that it is in the best interest of affected communities.
  
• Staff Security: National staff may have difficulties remaining neutral, especially if they are members of one of the groups in conflict. They may also be put in situations of insecurity because of their engagement; Due to this concern, in Sri Lanka, it has been found essential to have an international staff presence at all levels.
  
• UNICEF's negotiations with the LTTE have never prejudiced its ability to engage with the government.

Ensuring commitment

(Section 6.3)

• UNICEF's experience highlights that even in situations where an agreement is reached and commitments have been made between high-level leaders in an armed group and high-level UN personnel, there is never total guarantee that these commitments will not be violated. However, having a formal agreement has meant that the LTTE could be held accountable for violations and gave strength to UNICEF's advocacy.

Points to Remember—So You're Negotiating … Now What?

POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF HUMANITARIAN NEGOTIATIONS

• Changes in perceived neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian actors engaged in negotiations;

TO MITIGATE: (A) clearly communicate the objectives and the scope of the negotiations with armed groups; (B) communicate and negotiate with all parties to a given conflict.

• Impacts on humanitarian security;

TO MITIGATE: (A) meet with the armed group in a neutral location/venue; (B) request security guarantees from the armed group prior to entering into negotiations; (C) ensure that the necessary parties are informed of the humanitarian negotiations (e.g. the host country government).

• Third-party influence and ‘sanctions' on humanitarian negotiators;

TO MITIGATE: (A) engage in parallel advocacy efforts and bilateral humanitarian diplomacy with regional organizations, the host country government and neighbouring States to gain support for the humanitarian negotiations; (B) ensure that the objectives and process of negotiating with the armed group are effectively communicated to those actors that may seek to exert pressure to constrain the negotiations; (C) build consensus and support for humanitarian negotiations across humanitarian organizations.

COMMITMENT TO THE AGREEMENT

• Secure/enhance commitment by: (1) Ensuring ‘Buy In' and Ownership; (2) Clear Statement of Implementation Roles; (3) Emphasizing Accountability; and (4) Including All Parties in Monitoring of Implementation (Section 6.3).

ENFORCEMENT

• By incentives or coercion (“carrot and stick”)
  
• Other actors (States, regional organizations) better placed to apply diplomatic/ other pressure to armed group.
  
• Humanitarian organizations can continue negotiating on issues of enforcement, attempt to persuade armed group, focusing on accountability of armed group (See Section 3.3).

DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS

• (1) Establishment of an implementation monitoring commission; (2) Referral of disputed provisions to an independent non-binding arbitration mechanism; (3) Appointment of a neutral mediator to assist the parties in resolving disputes.

DEALING WITH NON-COMPLIANCE

• Enter into further negotiations with the armed group to arrive at an agreed outcome which may resolve the issues of non-compliance with the original agreement.
  
• Identify third party States, regional organizations or other actors and engage, directly or indirectly, in advocacy and humanitarian diplomacy to get these actors to apply pressure (diplomatic, other) to the armed group to comply with the agreement.

• If non-compliance with the agreement results in an operating environment which compromises humanitarian security; consider, as a last resort, suspension of humanitarian activities until a conducive humanitarian operating environment is re-established.