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Russian Federation
In 2005, Chechnya experienced slight improvements its security environment
and living conditions. This improvement has prompted the Security
Management Team (SMT) to consider a reduction from Phase V to Phase
IV. However, general instability continues and has increased in
other republics of the North Caucasus. In Chechnya, bombings, ambushes,
sweep operations and targeted killings have continued. In Dagestan
the situation has become particularly worrisome, as assassinations
of police officers, bombings of strategic targets and other acts
of violence have taken place with increasing frequency. Ingushetia
has suffered a series of bombing attacks, including several assassination
attempts against prominent members of the government. Kabardino-Balkaria
has also, though to a lesser extent, been the site of incidents
of violence. North Ossetia has remained the quietest, although it
too has seen occasional explosions as well as civil protests of
a larger size than in Ingushetia.
The UN and a range of NGOs have been implementing a comprehensive
humanitarian assistance and protection operation in the North Caucasus,
in an extremely challenging working environment, since 1999. This
operation has been strongly supported by the diplomatic and donor
community, and is well coordinated with federal and local authorities.
As the humanitarian situation in Chechnya and the neighboring republics
remains serious, agencies, government and donors expect OCHA to
remain fully engaged in field coordination.
The OCHA office is heavily engaged in managing recovery-oriented
transition planning, laying the groundwork for an eventual phasing
out, in several years, of the humanitarian operation. At the request
of the government, there will be no CAP for 2006. However, a CAP
Review in spring 2005, led jointly by the HC and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, concluded that the level of humanitarian need was
unlikely to be reduced and that the local capacity to meet the need
had not significantly increased. Therefore, the humanitarian community
is challenged to meet the most pressing humanitarian assistance
and protection needs of the population without a CAP in 2006. Meanwhile,
UNDP, the World Bank, the EC, and other traditional development
partners have become more active in the North Caucasus and started
defining an appropriate role for themselves in this G8 country.
The Russian Government has also taken significant steps to develop
its global humanitarian profile. It established a budget for annual
contributions to UNHCR and WFP, and it provided approximately US$
22 million in tsunami relief (some US$ 10 million channeled as UN
contributions, including US$ 3 million for OCHA).
The aim of the UN and its partners in the North Caucasus is to
conduct a range of assistance projects in relief and development
simultaneously for several years, meeting urgent humanitarian risk
and addressing its root causes to ensure the smooth transition of
international assistance in the North Caucasus. All consultations
within the UNCT and with partners have concluded that the existing
humanitarian-coordination mechanisms must remain firmly in place.
An NGO Consortium was formed in 2005, and the HC invited this Consortium
along with the ICRC to join UN Heads of Agency in forming an IASC
field team.
OCHA has strongly advocated for and contributed to inter-agency
plans for an increased UN presence in the Republic of Chechnya.
Greater access in Chechnya and Dagestan is expected, with OCHA basing
staff in Chechnya for the first time. With positive signals coming
from UNDSS in New York about the down- phasing of security in Chechnya
or parts thereof OCHA together with other UN humanitarian agencies
is ready to establish a permanent, initially low-profile presence
in Grozny. Humanitarian coordination will be more complex, given
the above considerations. A Protection Strategy will be developed
among humanitarian agencies and local authorities and special efforts
will be needed to mobilize funding in the absence of a 2006 Consolidated
Appeal.
In 2006, OCHA’s objectives are to: coordinate humanitarian
assistance and protection in Chechnya and the North Caucasus in
an evolving environment; promote recovery-oriented assistance in
the North Caucasus; strengthen information management and analysis;
and help the government better define and realize its global humanitarian
goals.
Activities:
- Lead the overall humanitarian needs analysis and help target
assistance and protection.
- Adapt coordination mechanisms to be more effective, concentrating
on reform of the sector working groups.
- Support the completion and implementation of a Protection Strategy.
- Establish an OCHA presence in Chechnya.
- Involve the Development Coordination Group (DCG) in joint planning
with the Humanitarian Coordination Group.
- Track and raise funding for the humanitarian operation (CAP
Section, Donor Relations, embassies, agencies).
- Define benchmarks for OCHA RF exit from the North Caucasus/Russian
Federation, with a preliminary, estimated timetable (Desk, humanitarian
agencies).
- Fully mobilize the OCHA Information Management Team to modify
existing practices of data collection, analysis, information-sharing,
and advocacy.
- Organize a workshop on program planning and monitoring.
- Analyze Russian humanitarian funding and bilateral assistance
patterns, and advocate to government suggested next steps (FTS,
MFA, EMERCOM).
- Support UNDAC-support training course in Russia (FCSS, EMERCOM).
Indicators:
- OCHA and other agencies’ staff presence in Chechnya and
Dagestan (number of staff and number of days).
- Geographical coverage of relief and protection projects in
the Transitional Workplan.
- Number of hits and satisfaction among partners with the OCHA
website.
- Transitional program well funded in 2005.
- 2007 humanitarian program reduced, barring a deterioration
of the humanitarian situation.
- Amount of funding mobilized.
- Wider geographical spread of Russian humanitarian action.
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
|
| Planned Staffing |
Extra-budgetary |
|
| Professional |
4
|
| National |
3 |
| Local (GS) |
12 |
| UN Volunteers |
- |
| Total |
19 |
|
| Staff costs (US$) |
1,332,284 |
| Non-staff costs (US$) |
541,270 |
|
| Total costs (US$) |
1,873,554 |
|
|
|
